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Overview 
Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, or NetzDG law1 represents a key test for combatting 
hate speech on the internet. 
Under the law, which came into effect on January 1, 2018, online platforms face fines of up to 
€50 million for systemic failure to delete illegal content. Supporters see the legislation as a 
necessary and efficient response to the threat of online hatred and extremism. Critics view it 
as an attempt to privatise a new ‘draconian’ censorship regime, forcing social media platforms 
to respond to this new painful liability with unnecessary takedowns. 
This study shows that the reality is in between these extremes. NetzDG has not provoked mass 
requests for takedowns. Nor has it forced internet platforms to adopt a ‘take down, ask later’ 
approach. Removal rates among the big three platforms ranged from 21.2% for Facebook to 
only 10.8% for Twitter.  
At the same time, it remains uncertain whether NetzDG has achieved significant results in 
reaching its stated goal of preventing hate speech. Evidence suggests that platforms are 
wriggling around strict compliance. Consider Facebook. The social network makes it difficult to 
fill out NetzDG complaints. Instead, Facebook prefers to cite their murkily defined community 
standards to take down vast amounts of content.  
It is easy to understand the temptation to revert to self-defined and controlled community 
standards for takedowns; by using them, rather than NetzDG reporting standards, companies 
escape the potential risk of severe liabilities under the law. 
Although the other big social media platforms, Google and Twitter, made it easier to report 
NetzDG complaints, the law did not change their behaviour significantly. They rejected almost 
four fifths of the complaints.  
NetzDG seems to have done little to advance the goal of eradicating extremist content from 
the internet. It does nothing to address the dangerous issue of blocking re-uploads of illegal 
content. The Counter Extremism Project recently released a study that shows YouTube’s efforts 
to proactively remove ISIS terrorist content is failing, in Germany and elsewhere.2 Some 91% of 
the ISIS videos examined were uploaded more than once; 24% of terrorist videos remained 
online for more than two hours. YouTube is losing this game of whack-a-mole with ISIS 
campaigners. This suggests that self-regulation has not worked, but so far regulations have not 
adequately addressed these issues either. Under NetzDG, tech companies face no obligation 
to stop re-uploads, which effectively makes known terrorist videos available online in 
perpetuity. Every time the content appears online, it must be flagged and checked again. This 
is neither efficient nor effective. 
                                                     
1 “Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks” (2017), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/ 
Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
2 “The EGLYPH Web Crawler: ISIS Content on YouTube,” 2018, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/ 
default/files/eGLYPH_web_crawler_white_paper_July_2018.pdf. 
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The German government has not lived up to its responsibilities under the law, either. It has not 
yet offered a clearer definition of the law’s vague description of “obviously illegal” content or 
systematic failure of compliance. The government only plans to release a study of NetzDG’s 
impact in three years’ time. 
In an era of instant communication, this delay seems far too long. Pressure is mounting inside 
the European Union for strong action to combat online hatred. France has proposed a law to 
fight ‘fake news’. The European Commission itself has proposed a law to combat online terrorist 
propaganda. Both are narrower than NetzDG. We examine the Commission proposal at the end 
of this paper – and find that there are lessons to be learned from the European Union approach, 
including for NetzDG.  
In some cases, the financial cost of NetzDG compliance can be high. While the Big Three tech 
companies – Facebook, Google, and Twitter – are able to absorb these costs, new start-up 
platforms may not. Perhaps even worse, the three major platforms have each come up with 
their own individual reporting formulas, making it difficult for users to flag NetzDG violations in 
a consistent and streamlined manner.  
This paper begins by explaining the background that led to the development and passage of 
NetzDG. It examines the reaction to the law by civil society, platforms and the government. It 
concludes with suggestions, for platforms, civil society and the authorities, on ways to improve 
the law to be effective in the fight against online hate while keeping the internet open and free.  
CEPS acknowledges the Counter Extremism Project’s support for this research. The study was 
conducted in complete independence. It is based on interviews with regulators, company 
representatives, and civil society activists. The authors take full responsibility for its findings. 
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1. The problem 
Policymakers throughout Europe are grappling with the challenge of how to curb the 
prevalence of illegal web content. Algorithms that seek to maximise user engagement have 
created echo chambers and filter bubbles, which reinforce societal divisions and prejudices. 
Hateful language leads to real-world crime.3 
Europeans are increasingly turning to regulation to address these digital side effects. 
It can be challenging to determine the legality of content that falls under hate speech – or 
“incitement to hatred” as referred to in Germany’s criminal code. At what point the industry 
has done ‘enough’ is a political question beyond the scope of this paper. If history serves as a 
guide, many improvements (e.g. in the fight against online child sexual abuse material) stem 
from public pressure and close coordination between tech companies, civil society and the 
government.  
So far, the European Commission has addressed illegal web content with a mix of regulatory 
and non-regulatory measures. These include the Directive on combatting child sexual abuse 
material 2011/93/EU and the Directive on combatting terrorism 2017/541. Its 
Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (2018)1177 and the 
recently proposed Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online deal 
with online content.  
The Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC) provides internet intermediaries with 
significant protections. Under the e-Commerce Directive, technology companies only become 
liable for content once it has been brought to their attention. They are exempt from being 
required to proactively filter content. This freedom has allowed social media to develop and 
thrive, but it has also contributed to the rapid dissemination of illegal content.  
In recent years, tech companies have adopted voluntary measures include the formation of the 
European Union’s Internet Forum in 2015, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism 
(GIFCT), and the Code of Conduct on Combatting Hate Speech adopted in May 2016 and signed 
by Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Microsoft, and later Instagram. 
Since the Code’s implementation, the European Commission has reported some progress. After 
the third monitoring, released in January 2018 the Commission reported that “companies have 
                                                     
3 See for example the controversial study: Karsten Müller and Carlo Schwarz, “Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social 
Media and Hate Crime” (Warwick, 2018), https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/crschwarz/fanning-
flames-hate.pdf. 
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strengthened their reporting systems, making it easier to report hate speech, and have 
improved their transparency vis-à-vis notifiers and users in general”. Subsequent rounds of EU 
monitoring demonstrated steady improvements in removal rates across the EU. In Germany, 
for example, the average rate of removals for Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube combined went 
from 52% in the first monitoring exercise (Dec 2016) to 100% in the third monitoring exercise 
the following year.  
This 100% figure fuels debate. It could be interpreted to show that Facebook, Google and 
Twitter are taking down content without careful analysis, under pressure not only from the 
Code but more recently from NetzDG. But the 100% takedown refers only to little more than 
200 pieces of content reported by two German accredited flaggers.4 Definitive conclusions are 
impossible to draw from such a small sample. 
2. The genesis of NetzDG  
At the beginning of 2015, Germany had accepted one million refugees, most from the Middle 
East. A right-wing anti-migrant backlash ensued. On social media, hate speech proliferated, 
targeting both refugees and government officials that were deemed responsible for Germany’s 
open immigration policy. 
Justice Minister Heiko Maas responded by creating a task force on hate speech. Between 
September 2016 and September 2017, the task force convened six meetings with Google, 
Facebook, Twitter and civil society representatives. Tech companies committed to creating 
user-friendly reporting tools and to removing most illegal content within 24 hours of 
notification.5 The government committed to discussing measures to improve the prosecution 
of online hate crimes.6 
Maas subsequently vowed to test its results. His government assigned accredited flagger 
Jugendschutz.net, an organisation monitoring youth protection laws, to conduct an empirical 
assessment.  
Over the course of two eight-week periods, July to August 2016 and January to February 2017, 
Jugendschutz.net investigated content that violated Article 130 (incitement to hatred and 
Holocaust denial) and Article 86a (use of symbols from unconstitutional organisations), and the 
Youth Protection Act. Based on 200 reported pieces of content per tested platform, Facebook 
                                                     
4 In Germany these were the Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter e.V. (FSM) and 
Jugendschutz.net. 
5 These include a better and more transparent enforcement of terms of service, access to German legal 
specialists, adequate training for content moderators, and the use of effective counter-narratives. 
6 “Together against Hate Speech: Ways to Tackle Online Hateful Content Proposed by the Task Force against 
Illegal Online Hate Speech,” 2015, https://www.fair-im-netz.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/News/Artikel/ 
12152015_TaskForceErgebnispapier_eng.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
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removed 39%, YouTube 90% and Twitter 1%. Looking solely at content removed within 24 
hours of being flagged, the rates fell to 31% for Facebook, 82% for YouTube and 0% for Twitter.7  
Maas used the Jugendschutz.net findings to justify NetzDG. Opponents questioned the study’s 
empirical basis.8 Maas stuck to his conclusion that social media was allowing too much illegal 
content online and not taking user complaints seriously.9 He affirmed that the big stick of the 
law was the only way to fight the scourge of illegal content.  
The government wanted to act quickly. It introduced the NetzDG bill on March 27, 2017. 
Parliament approved it less than five months later despite considerable opposition, not only 
from its targets, Facebook, Google, and Twitter, but also from large segments of civil society. 
After several key amendments were made (see Appendix A1), the law passed virtually 
unanimously among the Christian and Social Democrats. Left-wing parliamentarians voted 
against it. The Greens abstained.  
NetzDG applies to all for-profit social media platforms with at least two million registered users 
in Germany. Media is exempt, as are messaging services such as WhatsApp and Telegram 
designed for individual communication. 
Under the law, social networks are obliged to set up an effective complaint mechanism and to 
produce a report every six months on how they have handled complaints. Criminal offenses 
that fall under the law include the breach of public peace, incitement to hatred, insult, and 
defamation. See Appendix Box 2 for a complete list.  
Social networks have the additional option of setting up a self-regulation authority, to whom 
they can outsource the decision on content. The platforms must designate a domestic point of 
contact to receive information requests from German law enforcement, to which they must 
respond within 48 hours of receipt.10  
Social networks must delete or block obviously illegal content within 24 hours. They have up to 
a week to decide on all other complaints. The seven-day period can be extended if the case 
remains unclear. The social network can contact the user who filed the complaint. 
                                                     
7 “Löschung Rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge Bei Facebook , YouTube Und Twitter: Ergebnisse Des Monitorings von 
Beschwerdemechanismen Jugendaffiner Dienste” (Jugendschutz.net, 2017), http://www.astrid-online.it/static/ 
upload/juge/jugenschutz.net_hassbeitrage_03_2017.pdf. 
8 “Monitoring Des Beschwerdemanagements von Social-Media-Plattformen Bei Hassbotschaften,” 2017, 
https://www.jugendschutz.net/fileadmin/download/pdf/17-06_Monitoring_Beschwerdemanagement_Social-
Media-Plattformen_Hintergruende.pdf. 
9 “Gemeinsam Gegen Hasskriminalität Im Netz – Wo Stehen Wir?” (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz, 2016), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Artikel/DE/2016/09262016_Gemeinsam 
_gegen_Hasskriminalitaet.html. 
10 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks. 
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Fines only can be imposed for “systematic” breaches of the law. If the social network makes an 
honest mistake in judgment, or overlooks an item by error, it faces no liability.  
Recent debate around NetzDG centred around a fundamental question: Who should be held 
accountable for content once it is deemed illegal by national law? The key piece of European 
legislation answering these questions is the e-Commerce Directive. 
Whether NetzDG undermines the e-Commerce Directive is fiercely contested. During the 
drafting on the bill, free expression advocates argued that the NetzDG proposal violates Article 
14 of the e-Commerce Directive because it requires tech companies to proactively prevent re-
uploads of illegal content.11 
In response to these criticisms, lawmakers watered down some crucial points of NetzDG. In the 
final text, tech companies are no longer obliged to proactively prevent re-uploads of previously 
designated illegal content.  
This change angered many. Jugendschutz.net argued that re-upload obligations do not 
represent a general filtering obligation and were consistent with recitals 47 and 48 of the e-
Commerce Directive:12 
(47) Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service 
providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not concern 
monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by 
national authorities in accordance with national legislation.  
(48) This Directive does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring 
service providers, who host information provided by recipients of their service, to 
apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from them and which are 
specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal 
activities.  
The final law received criticism from all sides. Supporters felt that NetzDG was too weak. The 
Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (LSVD) claimed that the list of criminal offences 
included in the law was incomplete and that the 24-hour limit is much too long for obviously 
illegal content.13 The Central Council of Jews in Germany called for the law to apply to all tech 
                                                     
11 Gerald Spindler, “Legal Expertise Commissioned by BITKOM” (Göttingen, 2017), https://www.bitkom.org/ 
noindex/Publikationen/2017/Sonstiges/Legal-Expertise-Official-2-0.pdf. 
12 “DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL,” Pub. L. No. 2000/31/EC, 1 
(2000), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031&from=EN. 
13 Manfred Bruns, “Stellungnahme Des Lesben- Und Schwulenverbandes” (Karlsruhe, 2017), 
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Stellungnahmen/2017/Downloads/03302017_Stell
ungnahme_LSVD_RefE_NetzDG.pdf;jsessionid=88D528B3C3EF15D7D3ED45DD4F6770EB.2_cid297?__blob=publ
icationFile&v=2. 
GERMANY’S NETZDG: A KEY TEST FOR COMBATTING ONLINE HATE | 5 
 
companies, not only those with more than two million users.14 It said users should be required 
to identify themselves when registering with a platform so that they can be held accountable 
for their posts.15 
Free expression advocates disagreed. They argue that anonymity allows whistle-blowers and 
other critics to speak without fear of retribution.16 Others criticised NetzDG for privatising law 
enforcement. The Federal Association for Information Technology (Bitkom) claimed the law 
shifts the responsibility for tackling illegal content away from public authorities and courts to 
private companies.17 The Association of the Internet Industry (eco) agreed, alleging that the 
state was abdicating its responsibility.18 Journalist organisations such as Reporters without 
Borders argued that courts, not social media platforms, should decide on the legality of 
content.19  
These free expression advocates and industry representatives thought NetzDG would 
incentivise tech companies to make hasty decisions and take down legal content. Since no 
punishment exists for blocking or deleting legal content in Germany, the platforms would push 
the delete button to avoid the potential heavy fines. David Kaye, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, raised further concerns: he argued that 
decisions about the legitimacy of content would in many cases require an in-depth assessment 
of the context of speech, something social media companies would not be able to 
provide.20 Human Rights Watch and other international critics also opposed NetzDG because, 
                                                     
14 Daniel Botmann, “Stellungnahme Des Zentralrats Der Juden in Deutschland” (Berlin, 2017), 
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Stellungnahmen/2017/Downloads/03272017_Stell
ungnahme_ZdJ_RefE_NetzDG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Markus Reuter, “New Hate Speech Law in Germany: Already Extended Before It Enters Into Force,” 
Netzpolitik.Org, 2017, https://netzpolitik.org/2017/new-hate-speech-law-in-germany-already-extended-before-
it-enters-into-force/. 
17 Marie-Teresa Weber, “Bitkom Stellungnahme Zum Referentenentwurf Eines Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgeset-
Zes” (Berlin, 2017), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Stellungnahmen/2017/ 
Downloads/03302017_Stellungnahme_Bitkom_RefE_NetzDG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
18 “Starre 24h-Frist Zur Löschung Illegaler Inhalte Ist Realitätsfern Und Fördert Wahllose Löschkultur Im 
Internet,” Eco Verband Der Internetwirtschaft, 2017, https://www.eco.de/presse/starre-24h-frist-zur-loeschung-
illegaler-inhalte-ist-realitaetsfern-und-foerdert-wahllose-loeschkultur-im-internet/. 
19 “Stellungnahme Zum Regierungsentwurf Des Gesetzes Zur Verbesserung Der Rechtsdurchsetzung in Sozialen 
Netzwerken (NetzDG)” (Berlin, 2017), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Stellung 
nahmen/2017/Downloads/04192017_Stellungnahme_RoG_RefE_NetzDG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
20 David Kaye, “Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression” (Geneva, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-
DEU-1-2017.pdf. 
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according to them, it would set a precedent for governments around the world to restrict 
online speech.21 
Tech companies criticised the haste under which NetzDG was put in place, comparing it 
unfavourably with the European Commission’s slow, measured and consultative approach. 
Germany should have insisted on more study and conducted an in-depth impact assessment, 
according to the tech companies. And it should have sought a European-wide law, rather than 
pursuing its own single-country approach.  
The German Federal Office of Justice (BfJ) did not share these same sentiments. It claims that 
compliance rules for social networks serve to ensure that they will comply with their legal 
obligation to delete or block unlawful content quickly and comprehensively.22 Many criticisms 
were made about the draft law, which included the proactive filtering requirements to prevent 
re-uploads. The final version eliminated these clauses and weakened the argument about 
filtering. The adopted NetzDG text clarified that the large €50 million fines could only be levied 
against firms that “systematically” evaded the law. A simple mistake or a difference of 
appreciation about the legality of a certain piece of content fell outside the law’s scope.  
Against this backdrop, NetzDG went into effect on January 1, 2018. That same day, Twitter and 
Facebook took down a post from German far-right AfD politician Beatrix von Storch, accusing 
the Cologne police of appeasing “barbaric, gang-raping Muslim hordes of men”.23 Twitter first 
blocked the post based on German law and later, based on its own community standards, 
suspended the account of Titanic, a German satirical magazine, for mocking von Storch’s tweet. 
These incidents reinforced the concern of NetzDG critics that the law, even in its diluted final 
form, would end up as a censorship tool. 
3. Six months on, what happened? 
Since these initial events, NetzDG has failed to generate any additional press reports of dubious 
false positives. No fines have been imposed. Although free expression groups continue to 
oppose the law out of censorship concerns, little evidence exists of widespread blocking. In July 
2018, Facebook, Google (Google+ and YouTube) and Twitter issued their first six-month 
NetzDG report cards. Contrary to expectations, the law has generated only a trickle, not the 
feared flood, of takedown requests. 
By submitting the required transparency reports and naming an authorised person to receive 
NetzDG complaints, the tech companies have complied with the law. When it comes to the 
                                                     
21 “Germany: Flawed Social Media Law,” Human Rights Watch, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/ 
germany-flawed-social-media-law. 
22 “Häufige Gestellte Fragen,” Bundesamt für Justiz, 2018, https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/Themen/ 
Buergerdienste/NetzDG/Fragen/FAQ_node.html;jsessionid=0 53C34F980F414BDFF7F3397BE33E259.2_cid377. 
23 Philip Oltermann and Pádraig Collins, “Two Members of Germany’s Far-Right Party Investigated by State 
Prosecutor,” The Guardian, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/02/german-far-right-mp-
investigated-anti-muslim-social-media-posts. 
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prevalence of content illegal under NetzDG, the impact of the law is less clear. Users previously 
had the ability to fill out a complaint form for content that they considered illegal. Facebook, 
Twitter, and Google removed an average of 92% of the reported illegal hate speech within 24 
hours.  
The biggest surprise was how the three big social media platforms differed in implementing 
required reporting mechanisms. Google and Twitter changed their interface to integrate a 
NetzDG flagging tool into their standard flagging notice. This allows German users to file 
NetzDG complaints directly from the piece of content. In contrast, Facebook has a separate 
reporting form that can be found via its Help Center, which is only accessible after several clicks. 
This has resulted in far fewer NetzDG complaints at Facebook compared to YouTube and 
Twitter (Table 1). 
Table 1. Overview of reported numbers by platform 
Platform Total items 
reported 
Total Removal 
Rate 
Removal  
within 24 hrs 
Facebook 1,704 362 (21.2%) 76.4% 
Google (YouTube) 241,827 58,297 (27.1%) 93.0% 
Twitter 264, 818 28,645 (10.8%) 93.8% 
Change.org 1,257 332 (26.4%) 92.7% 
 
3.1 Facebook 
Facebook says it has to have dedicated large resources to meeting the law’s requirements. It 
has 65 staff working on processing NetzDG complaints, which only amounted to 1,704 pieces 
of content. This averages fewer than five complaints per designated employee per month, but 
the staffing is flexible to allow for fluctuations in volume.24  
The law’s 24-hour constraint proved manageable when processing this small number of NetzDG 
complaints. It even permitted the company to consult external legal counsel 54 times before 
making a deletion decision.25  
                                                     
24 Facebook NetzDG Transparency Report, July 2018 https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/ 
2018/07/facebook_netzdg_july_2018_english-1.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3mIJeGMB-
rqwkK2aZT6ymF1JEG1B2eC38UbvqclHhWo9OmFUyrBFMFa8Y. 
25 Facebook NetzDG Transparency Report, July 2018. 
8 | ECHIKSON & KNODT 
 
In the first six months of the year, Facebook’s NetzDG transparency report shows that 74 pieces 
content were blocked in Germany for inciting to hatred.26 Within the same period, it removed 
a total of six million pieces of content globally for violating its community rules on hate 
speech.27  
Compared to Google and Twitter, Facebook seems to be wriggling around strict compliance by 
making it easier to cite their self-defined ‘community standards.’  
Figure 1. Facebook’s NetzDG Complaint Mechanism 
 
 
All reported content is first reviewed under Facebook’s community standards. If these are 
violated, then the piece of content is removed globally and is not included in the specific 
NetzDG transparency report. If content only violates German law but not Facebook’s terms of 
service, then the content is blocked only in Germany. This two-step approach has allowed 
Facebook to avoid having its broader content review process subject to NetzDG fines. 
In some respects, Facebook’s community guidelines are stricter than those under NetzDG. 
German law lists 21 different types of illegal content. Facebook bans many more categories 
including nudity. German law allows nudity. 
Numerous legal cases are open in Germany against Facebook over content removals. Judges 
have issued a series of contradictory rulings (Table 2). In some cases, plaintiffs challenged 
Facebook for deleting content that is legal under German law. In other cases, plaintiffs 
challenged Facebook for over-deleting based on its own definitions of hate speech. Some 
                                                     
26 Facebook NetzDG Transparency Report, July 2018. 
27 https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement#hate-speech 
GERMANY’S NETZDG: A KEY TEST FOR COMBATTING ONLINE HATE | 9 
 
judges have ruled in favour of protecting the freedom of expression enshrined in Article 5 of 
the German Constitution,28 while in other cases, judges asserted Facebook’s right to enforce 
its community guidelines.  
Contradictory decisions put Facebook in a difficult position. On the one, hand, it is required to 
delete information, at the risk of significant fines, while on the other hand it runs a significant 
risk of being sued for deleting legal content. German court decisions are content and context 
specific, making it difficult to establish any kind of precedent. The contradictory decisions 
muddle the picture and underline the complexity of determining and dealing with illegal 
content.  
Table 2. Recent lawsuits against Facebook 
Case Ruling 
LG Offenburg 
(26.09.2018) 
Facebook did not maintain the right to delete content that was legal 
according to German law. 
LG Frankfurt  
(10.09.2018) 
Facebook has the right to block a user account for 30 days due to hate 
speech, in some cases even if the content is protected under free speech.  
OLG München 
(27.08.2018) 
Facebook cannot delete posts that are legal in Germany.  
OLG Dresden 
(08.08.2018) 
Facebook can delete hate speech and temporarily block the affected user 
even if content does not violate German law. 
3.2 Google 
Google makes it easy to file NetzDG complaints, copying its existing user-friendly content 
complaint system. Simplicity generated an exponentially higher number of complaints than for 
Facebook: 241,827. 
Despite the high number, little evidence exists to demonstrate over-blocking. During the first 
six months of 2018, Google rejected the majority of NetzDG complaints (about 73%).  
Although the number of content moderators varies based on the number of complaints, about 
100 people work exclusively on NetzDG complaints.29  
In its transparency reporting, Google went far beyond the minimum reporting requirement, 
including additional tables and statistics, such as side-by-side comparison of content removed 
                                                     
28 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0041 
29 Google Germany (2018, August 27). Personal interview.  
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due to community guideline violations vs. content removed due to NetzDG violations. Figure 2 
shows additional content removed as a result of the law.  
Figure 2. Community guideline enforcement vs. NetzDG statutes (Jan 1 – Jun 30, 2018) 
 
 
Similar to Facebook, Google removes most content for violating community guideline 
violations. NetzDG complaints primarily relate to hate speech and political extremism. It 
remains unclear whether NetzDG content would have been reported via community guidelines 
in the absence of the law.  
Google believes much of the spike in illegal content filings results from the simplification of 
YouTube’s complaint interface, not NetzDG. YouTube’s community guidelines and German 
criminal law have a large degree of overlap.30  
Instead of the 24-hour deadlines, Google would prefer a stipulation to remove illegal content 
“without undue delay.” Google supports a fast, less than 24 hours, rule for removal of obviously 
illegal content such as child porn. On difficult-to-determine legal or illegal content such as 
“insults” or “defamation”, it would prefer more leeway. Final decisions on much difficult-to-
determine content should be left up to judges, Google says. 
 
                                                     
30 Google Germany (2018, August 27). Personal interview.  
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3.3 Twitter 
Twitter enjoys a strong reputation, even compared to other social media platforms, for 
protecting free speech. It has stood up to authoritarian regimes such as in Turkey, preferring in 
some cases to be banned rather than allow governments to dictate politically-motivated 
takedowns. 
Its NetzDG results reflected its reputation. Like Google, the company made it easy to report 
complaints under NetzDG and received more than 260,000. It took the hardest line before 
taking down content, accepting a mere 10.8%. 
This figure is in line with the company’s global percentage of content removals. About 60% of 
the complaints from users and trusted reporters dealt with incitement to hatred, insult, and 
defamation.  
In order to comply with NetzDG, Twitter depends on a staff of 50 and a separate reporting flow 
to analyse German complaints. Elsewhere, content is first reviewed against Twitter’s terms and 
conditions. In Germany, it is analysed against the NetzDG’s narrower definition of illegal 
content. Takedowns are reported back to the Lumen Database, an independent third-party 
research project that studies cease and desist letters that concern online content.31 
3.4 Change.org 
A fourth company required to submit a NetzDG report is Change.org, an online platform for 
sharing petitions. It has more than five million German users.  
For a small company with annual revenues of about half a million euros in 2017, the expense 
of implementing NetzDG was high.32 Rather than relying on advertisements, the platform raises 
money via membership fees, paid petition promotions, and crowdfunding. The cost of 
implementing NetzDG was estimated at about €5,000 and 30 working days in total, though the 
costs are predicted to be much lower going forward (5-10 working days). 
According to its first NetzDG report, Change.org employs 12 people in its Berlin office. The user 
support team consists of four people, responsible for processing complaints during the regular 
working hours. On weekends and holidays, the global policy team takes over. Since the law was 
implemented, the international team has treated the complaints based on NetzDG with 
priority, sometimes at the expense of complaints from other countries.  
                                                     
31 “Lumen: About Us” (Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 2017), 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/pages/about. 
32 Hackmack, G. (2018, October 4). Phone interview. 
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All violations of German law are included in Change.org’s own community guidelines, since its 
terms of service dictate that users cannot violate national laws. Content that violates NetzDG 
is blocked in Germany and deleted. This was already the case before NetzDG went into effect.33 
Change.org has seen few additional complaints arising from NetzDG, probably because NetzDG 
is not well known among the platform’s users. The company noted however that the number 
of complaints increased when there were media reports about NetzDG.34  
In Change.org’s opinion, NetzDG does not restrict freedom of expression. Instead, company 
officials say the deletion of illegal content such as hate speech helps ensure a safe online 
environment and the free exchange of opinions.35 
3.5 Regulated self-regulation 
NetzDG allows companies to set up self-regulatory systems together with an independent 
institution. Google and Facebook have decided to work with the Voluntary Self-Control for 
Multimedia Service Providers (FSM) – the association that works as an intermediary between 
media companies and the Commission for the Protection of Minors. In the case of NetzDG, the 
FSM will help tech companies review questionable content in compliance with criminal law.  
Google sees its participation as a sign of willingness to build bridges – a helpful alternative when 
courts are unable to be the final arbiter on illegal content.36 Facebook believes it will help their 
content teams learn and increase create accountability and oversight.37  
Under these NetzDG partnerships, committees consisting of three lawyers will provide a legal 
opinion on the content they receive within seven days. Tech companies will continue to do 
most takedowns by themselves. The partnership committees will only receive about 5-10 ‘high-
profile’ cases per month.38 
This system provides several potential advantages. Unlike tech companies, which use service 
centres to decide on takedowns, this new body represents an independent authority staffed 
by lawyers able to make authoritative decisions. Over time, decisions on difficult pieces of 
content will create a useful library. 
                                                     
33 “NetzDG Bericht 1. Halbjahr 2018” (Berlin, 2018), https://static.change.org/help/NetzDG-Bericht-2018.pdf. 
34 Hackmack, G. (2018, October 4). Phone interview. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Google Germany (2018, August 27). Personal interview. 
37 Facebook Germany (2018, October 9). Personal interview.  
38 Drechsler, M. (2018, September 9). Personal Interview. 
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3.6  Government reaction 
The German government continues to support NetzDG. In a statement,39 the leading coalition 
partner, the Christian Democrat Party, argued that the transparency reports demonstrated no 
evidence of over-blocking. According to the party’s parliamentarian spokesman for digital 
affairs Tankred Schipanski, NetzDG represents an important building block to strengthen 
“responsible and respectful interaction”. 
The Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection shares this opinion. In the Ministry’s view, the 
companies’ transparency reports suggest that they are able to examine the reported content 
quickly and thoroughly - and at a manageable expense for the companies. Although Gerd Billen, 
State Secretary at the Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, said it was too early to 
deliver a definitive judgement, since "we are only at the beginning of assessing the impact of 
the Network Enforcement Act, “it was "right to establish clear statutory regulations and create 
appropriate pressure on the companies to take action in dealing with criminal content”. It is 
necessary to have “clear regulations for user-friendly reporting options”, he added, saying that 
he is investigating whether some social media platforms are still making it too difficult for their 
users. 
Prosecutors have not brought a single case to court under NetzDG. The government only plans 
on doing a full analysis of the law’s impact after three years. According to Germany’s Minister 
of State for Digitization, Dorothee Bär, the process is “still ongoing”.40  
4. International implications  
Pressure is mounting throughout the European Union for strong action to combat online 
hatred. France has put forward a law to fight ‘fake news’. The European Commission proposed 
a law in September to combat online terrorist propaganda. Both proposals are narrower than 
NetzDG.  
The German government also favours a European solution. NetzDG author Maas believes that 
a German regulation for tech companies is only the first step – the ultimate goal is to have a 
European solution.41 
The European Commission proposal is limited to measures designed to fight terrorism and 
political extremism, not all types of illegal material. NetzDG fails to differentiate between 
terrorist incitement and counterfeit products.  
                                                     
39 “Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz Wirkt: Bilanz Nach 6 Monaten NetzDG,” CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag, 2018, https://www.cducsu.de/themen/innen-recht-sport-und-ehrenamt/netzwerkdurchsetzungs 
gesetz-wirkt. 
40 German Federal Chancellery. (2018, October 9). Email Exchange. 
41 “Heiko Maas Zum Kabinettbeschluss Eines Gesetzes Zur Verbesserung Der Rechtsdurchsetzung in Sozialen 
Netzwerken” (Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2017), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/ 
Zitate/DE/2017/040517_Kabinett_NetzDG.html?nn=6704238. 
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By deciding to legislate, the Commission said it aimed to stop a proliferation of national 
initiatives within the EU such as NetzDG. In this sense, NetzDG has put pressure on the 
Commission to act. As the European Parliament considers the Commission proposal, it must 
find solutions for several tough issues.  
What is “illegal terrorist content”? At present, each EU member has its own definition. The 
European Parliament needs to find a common classification. Since EU member states already 
have an agreed list of terrorist groups, it is reasonable to expect that they will come to a 
consensus. 
A reasonable consensus also must be found on the scope of the new regulation. NetzDG limited 
itself to social media platforms. Arguably, WhatsApp and other communications services 
should have been included. The present Commission proposal not only includes these 
messaging services – it also includes cloud providers and open source software developing 
platforms. There is a growing use of cloud storage sites to spread extremist material.42  
Under the current proposal, “competent authorities” are required to oversee the new law and 
impose fines. What is the competent authority? It should be defined more clearly. It should be 
a judicial authority whose functions and responsibilities are detailed.  
The proposal requires removals of terrorist content within an hour. NetzDG suggests that this 
requirement is feasible without resulting in unnecessary disruptions and costs.  
Although the EU insists on automated filtering, it is restricted to a limited number of agreed-
on terrorist groups. In this way, it skirts contravention of the cherished e-Commerce Directive 
Article 14 on general monitoring. If hosting providers fail to block or take down terrorist content 
by mistake, they should not face fines. 
A final concern is the lack of a common EU level for fines. National governments are left free to 
decide on the level of punishment in most cases. This introduces a risk that the same error may 
face different sanctions in different countries.43 
Beyond the European Commission proposal, additional measures are required to fight online 
terrorism. Under NetzDG, tech companies face no obligation to stop re-uploads. Every time the 
content appears online, it must be flagged and checked again. This is neither efficient nor 
effective and should prompt the European Commission to implement binding obligations for 
platforms to work with Europol to build up a comprehensive database of hashes, to prevent re-
uploads of known harmful content. Hashes are numeric values of a fixed length that can give 
                                                     
42 “ISIS’ Tactics Shift On The Battlefield &amp; Over The Internet | Counter Extremism Project” (Counter 
Extremism Project , 2018) https://www.counterextremism.com/press/isis’-tactics-shift-battlefield-over-internet. 
43 “Digital Single Market: Bringing down Barriers to Unlock Online Opportunities” (European Commission, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en. 
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content (in this case image, video, and audio files) a unique value – the conceptual equivalent 
of a digital fingerprint.  
NetzDG itself seems to have done little to fight terrorism. Terrorists are moving off the Big 
Three social networks to smaller platforms such as Gab.com.44 The suspected shooter in the 
Pittsburgh synagogue mass murder used that forum to tout his anti-Semitic views and 
announce his intentions to kill Jews.45 
5. Recommendations for tackling illegal content 
Establish clear reporting and enforcement standards  
The three major social network platforms have each come up with their own individual 
reporting formulas, making it difficult in some cases for users to flag NetzDG violations. The 
reports follow their own individual company-specific structure. Recommended guidelines 
should be provided for the transparency reports so as to provide comparable numbers. The 
FSM (that facilitated self-regulation) could create a quality standard for complaint mechanisms 
enabling the certification of tech companies for user-friendly reporting. Tech companies should 
also continue to increase their capabilities and ensure that the appropriate skills and resources 
are available to implement laws such as NetzDG.  
Target terrorist content 
Different types of content merit different approaches. NetzDG includes 21 criminal offenses, 
failing to differentiate between different dangers (Box A2). The European Union law targets 
specific terrorist content uploaded by organisations on a commonly agreed list. This targeted 
approach limits the danger of over-blocking. When it comes to explicitly illegal terrorist 
propaganda, lawmakers should consider the use of re-upload filters to address the issue, 
already common practice in the fight against child pornography.  
Establish a clearing house for disputed content 
NetzDG requires social media platforms to inform both the person submitting the complaint 
and the author about any decision to take down content. This is accomplished via multiple-
choice forms. A better approach for disputing content would be to create a clearing house for 
complaints.46 This would offer users better recourse for disputing deleted content. It would be 
an additional barrier against over-blocking and would keep tech companies accountable for 
how they enforce their terms of service.  
                                                     
44 Twitter (2018, August 23). Phone interview.  
45 Kevin Roose, “On Gab, an Extremist-Friendly Site, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Aired His Hatred in Full,” New 
York Times, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-
shootings.html. 
46 “Stellungnahme Des Bundesrates,” Pub. L. No. Drucksache 315/17 (Beschluss), accessed October 19, 2018, 
https://www.cr-online.de/0315_17_B.pdf. 
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More resources for law enforcement 
Fighting online hate speech requires more than just deleting content from social media. The 
victims of hate speech must also be able to confront their aggressor via judicial procedure. 
Without the threat of prosecution, there is no adequate incentive for haters and trolls to 
discontinue their dangerous online behaviour.  
State Criminal Police (LKA) organisations must ensure that cyber criminality is being addressed. 
They need the necessary cyber competences to cooperate with tech companies on prosecuting 
cybercrime. A positive example is the Central Point of Contact for Cybercrime (ZAC) for all 
companies and authorities in Schleswig-Holstein. Other federal states should look at 
implementing similar systems in order to streamline the fight against cybercrime. 
Invest in better research and training 
Understanding the complexities of social media and how algorithms function is critical for 
lawmakers, law enforcement authorities, and the cyber-competence of society. All tech 
companies should continue to allow research on their APIs so that progress (e.g. on the quick 
removal of ISIS propaganda) and trends (e.g. the spread of false information during elections) 
can be investigated. Facebook has disabled this option for independent researchers. Since 
aggregated numbers are difficult to verify, governments should require Facebook, Twitter and 
Google to allow access to ‘raw’ aggregated data for the purpose of analysis. 
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Annex 
Table A 1. Key selected changes to the draft bill 
SECTION DRAFT FINAL BILL 
§ 1 Scope For-profit internet platforms 
that allow users to share 
and exchange content with 
each other and the public. 
For-profit internet platforms with the 
main purpose of allowing users to share 
and exchange content with each other 
and the public. Platforms designed for 
individual communication or specific kinds 
of content are excluded.  
§ 2 Reporting 
Requirements 
Quarterly; applies to all 
platforms with at least 2 
million users.  
Bi-annually; applies to platforms with at 
least 2 million users that receive more 
than 200 complaints in a calendar year.  
§ 3 Handling of 
Complaints  
Access to all unlawful 
content must be removed 
or blocked immediately and 
no later than 7 days after 
receiving the complaint. 
The 7-day time limit may be exceeded if: 
a) the decision regarding the unlawfulness 
of the content is dependent on the 
falsity of a factual allegation or is 
clearly dependent on other factual 
circumstances; in such cases, the social 
network can give the user an 
opportunity to respond to the 
complaint before the decision is 
rendered;  
b) the social network refers the decision 
regarding unlawfulness to a recognised 
self-regulation institution pursuant to 
subsections (6) to (8) within 7 days of 
receiving the complaint and agrees to 
accept the decision of that institution.  
 Any copies of unlawful 
content on the platforms 
must be removed or 
blocked immediately. 
No longer required 
 The procedure shall ensure 
that each complaint, along 
with the measure taken to 
redress the situation is 
documented within 
Germany.  
The procedure shall ensure that each 
complaint, along with the measure taken 
to redress the situation, is documented 
within the scope of Directives 2000/31/EC 
and 2010/13/EU.  
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Box A 1. Provisions on regulatory fines (Section 4, NetzDG) 
 
 
 (1) A regulatory offence shall be deemed to have been committed by any person who, 
intentionally or negligently,  
1. in contravention of section 2(1) sentence 1, fails to produce a report, to produce it 
correctly, to produce it completely or to produce it in due time, or fails to publish it, to 
publish it correctly, to publish it completely, to publish it in the prescribed form or to publish 
it in due time,  
2. in contravention of section 3(1) sentence 1, fails to provide, to provide correctly or to 
provide completely, a procedure mentioned therein for dealing with complaints submitted 
by complaints bodies or by users whose place of residence or seat is located in the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  
3. in contravention of section 3(1) sentence 2, fails to supply a procedure mentioned therein 
or to supply it correctly,  
4. in contravention of section 3(4) sentence 1, fails to monitor the handling of complaints or 
to monitor it correctly,  
5. in contravention of section 3(4) sentence 2, fails to rectify an organisational deficiency or 
to rectify it in due time,  
6. in contravention of section 3(4) sentence 3, fails to offer training or support or to offer 
them in due time, or  
7. in contravention of section 5, fails to name a person authorised to receive service in the 
Federal Republic of Germany or fails to name a person in the Federal Republic of Germany 
authorised to receive information requests from German law enforcement authorities, or  
8. in contravention of section 5 subsection (2), second sentence, fails to respond to requests 
for information while acting as the person authorised to receive service 
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Box A 2. Criminal offences included in NetzDG  
 
 
  
 Network Enforcement Act 
§ 86 (Dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations) 
§ 86a (Using symbols of unconstitutional organisations) 
§ 89a (Preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the state) 
§ 91 (Encouraging the commission of a serious violent offence endangering the state) 
§ 100a (Treasonous forgery) 
§ 111 (Public incitement to crime) 
§ 126 (Breach of the public peace by threatening to commit offences) 
§ 129 (Forming criminal organisations) 
§ 129a (Forming terrorist organisations) 
§ 129b (Criminal and terrorist organisations abroad; extended confiscation and deprivation) 
§ 130 (Incitement to hatred) 
§ 131 (Dissemination of depictions of violence) 
§ 140 (Rewarding and approving of offences) 
§ 166 (Defamation of religions, religious and ideological associations) 
§ 184b in connection with § 184d (Distribution, acquisition and possession of child 
pornography; Distribution of pornographic performances by broadcasting, media services or 
telecommunications services) 
§ 185 (Insult) 
§ 186 (Defamation) 
§ 187 (Intentional defamation) 
§ 201a (Violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs) 
§ 241 (Threatening the commission of a felony)  
§ 269 (Forgery of data intended to provide proof) 
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